The economic effect of Russian migration and the impact of this effect on public mood in Georgia

Introduction

The new, full-scale phase of unprovoked, unjustified military aggression Russia has been conducting against Ukraine since 2014 has impacted Georgia significantly. Like the countries of the Global South, the Georgian government officially declared neutrality and did not join the sanctions imposed by the West. However, unlike the countries of the Global South, Georgia seeks an EU membership candidate status and, thus, has to be interested in converging its foreign and security policy with the EU. In fact, the Georgian government has been forced to apply for the status amid massive demonstrations held in Tbilisi in February-March 2022 in support of Ukraine and against the background of the official applications submitted by Ukraine-Moldova for the EU membership candidacy.

In parallel with the application for the EU membership candidacy, the Georgian authorities took several steps that contradicted what the EU expects from countries seeking membership.[1] As a result, in June 2022, Ukraine and Moldova received the status of candidates for EU membership, while Georgia formally fell behind the other two members of the Association Trio and got only the "European perspective."

The seemingly neutral and gradually distinctly pro-Russian position[2] of the Georgian government towards Russia's unprovoked, unjustified aggression against Ukraine should be explained primarily by internal political factors. Of course, the non-alignment to Western sanctions and the increased trade with Russia had positive economic consequences for Georgia (see below in detail), and the Georgian government made these results part of the political campaign. However, the expected positive economic consequences did not dictate the pro-Russian position of the Georgian government. In fact, expected positive economic consequences were not apparent at all in Spring 2022 when the position of the Georgian Government became vividly pro-Russian.

With its authoritarian inclinations within the country, the Georgian government appeared a natural ally of the Russian authoritarian regime. As long as he wants to keep power for life, the de facto ruler of Georgia, Russian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, like other authoritarian rulers, applies repression against the political opposition, free media, and civil society, and he does it through a politicized justice system.

As we will see below, the Georgian society, though pro-Western and in solidarity with Ukraine, retained appreciation of the policy pursued by the government despite its pro-Russian stance and growing antagonism towards the West. As data indicates, the economic growth fueled by the Russian migration impacted the country's mood.

Expectations

Even before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, by the beginning of 2022, post-pandemic positive trends had been observed in the Georgian economy. The country ended 2021 with a 10.5% GDP growth. As illustrated in Figure 1, although it did not recover to the level of 2019, compared to 2020, the indicators of export, import, tourism, and foreign direct investment increased in 2021.

Figure 1[3]

This figure shows the expectations of TBC Capital analysts for 2022: for example, they assumed that the economy of Georgia would grow by 5.5% in 2022 (actual growth was 10.1%), and it would be mainly at the expense of tourism.

It should be noted that the dependence on Russia in terms of cash flows has slightly decreased in 2019-2021 (Figure 2).

Figure 2[4]

Figure 3 shows that by February 2022, Russia occupied the 3rd place in Georgia's exports, the 5th - in tourism, and the 2nd - in remittances.

Figure 3[5]

Figure 4, which appeared in the August 2022 Macro Overview[6] of the Policy and Management Consulting Group’s Research Center, captures vividly that forecasts for Georgia's real GDP growth rate for 2022 ranged from 2.0% to 12.2%. The substantial variance between estimates provided by Georgian and international institutions were explained by the multi-faceted uncertainty emanating from the rapidly changing global as well as local developments. There were also considerable differences between the forecasts made by the same institutions, even within a few months, due to uncertainty presented by the potential effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on Georgia. After the start of the full-scale war, forecasts decreased as tourism, trade, and remittances were all expected to decline.

Figure 4

The PMC Research Center itself predicted[7] that the growth rate of the Georgian economy in 2022 will amount to 5.6% (See Figure 5)

Figure 5

In order to understand what was the basis of such expectations and how the forecast changed during 2022, we will separately consider the reports of 4 research institutes. These reports also include the results for 2022, which clearly show the impact of Russian migration on the Georgian economy. As a result of the review, we will see that when assessing the economic consequences of such a large-scale event as the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, only the economic framework of analysis is insufficient.

TBC Capital

On February 28, 2022, TBC Capital published the Brief "Ukraine-Russia: Rapid or Delayed Resolution?" in which two scenarios were considered.

The first scenario has been considering Russia’s unprovoked, unjustified invasion of Ukraine as a relatively short-lived military conflict after which part of Ukraine remains occupied and an uneasy peace returned. Despite the sanctions imposed, TBC Capital has been expecting Russia to continue exporting energy to Europe though Nord Stream 2 is being blocked. “Unlike the 2014-2015 shock, oil & gas and other commodity prices surge, being important for both [Ukraine and Russia] economies. Brent hits $105 per barrel and declines to around $85 by the end of 2022,” – the brief said.[8] In this scenario, the real GDP growth in Georgia in 2022 is expected to be down from 6.0% to 3.5- 4.0%, and the GEL to depreciate by 5%, from USD/GEL 3.0 to 3.15 with a possibility of overshooting to around 3.3-3.4.

The second scenario assumed the war continued for more than a quarter. In this case, economists at TBC Capital expected that the West had to impose full-scale sanctions, including cut-off from the SWIFT system and export bans on the energy sector. “Energy prices still surge.

Brent hits $150 per barrel before normalizing to around $120 by the end of the year,” - the brief said.[9] In this scenario, an estimated net inflows loss would equal around 740 and 110 million USD when compared with 2022 earlier baseline and 2021, respectively. In only a minor, 5-10% GEL depreciation scenario, the 2022 GDP growth drops from 6% in the baseline without conflict to around 0.5%, and the shortage in net inflows is compensated by the central bank interventions and the government’s external borrowings. In a substantial depreciation scenario, the GEL weakens to around 3.5, not ruling out an overshooting, and the loss in net inflows is approximately halved; however, the growth turns slightly negative.

Both scenarios have assumed (see Figure 6) that exports to Russia and Ukraine and tourism and remittances from Russia and Ukraine would decline.

Figure 6[10]

Already in April,[11] TBC Capital started considering a migration impact on the tourism inflows and the resilience the remittances have demonstrated. In the next Macro Insights,[12] TBC Capital took note of the seasonally adjusted monthly annualized GDP growth of 6.7% in March. From the drivers of the growth, exports, and tourism inflows supported by the migration impact were stronger than expected, and remittances broadly aligned with expectations. Analyzing April-May data, Macro Insights authors said,[13] “Why Georgian Economy is projected to grow in 2022 up to 8 percent? Quick Answer: Tourism is expected to more than double.” Stronger were recovery in tourism with and also without [Russian] migration effect; outlook for the transit services exports; and growth in remittances, even after adjustments of inflows from Russia.

Updating the GDP growth projection for 2022 to 10.6% in August,[14] TBC Capital raised the question of the sustainability of growth and whether the Georgian economy is overheating. In the August report, the chief economist showed the impact of Russia on the following Figure 7:

Figure 7

In November TBC Capital published[15] its tourism projections for 2022 and 2023 (See Figure 8) where migration accounted 35% of total tourism inflows in 2022.

Figure 8

Exports to Russia and Ukraine have shown a recovery by summer but remained below pre-invasion levels (See Figure 9).

Figure 9

Assessing the year 2022 and forecasting 2023, TBC Capital noted:[16] “While the strong economic activity in 2022 is already a stylized fact, the important question is what would be the growth without a military escalation in the region. In this scenario, our estimate is around 8.3% on the back of higher growth in main economic partners and other positive spillovers. This is important when thinking of the baseline in 2023. Namely, the possible rapid resolution and considerable outflow of migrants do not necessarily mean an adverse macroeconomic impact on Georgia as, in this scenario, the country would benefit from a faster recovery in conventional tourism inflows, stronger growth in the EU, Russia, and Ukraine, higher EUR/USD, lower risk premium and likely also lower international commodity prices, inflation, and interest rates.”

TBC Capital estimates[17] the number of Russian migrants to be around 115,000 (75% in Tbilisi). It defines the average migrant profile as relatively young, white-collar, employed in information and telecom with an average income of migrant households of 2,600 USD (6 times more than the average Georgian household). Significantly, the first flow of migrants increased the number of middle-income families in Georgia by more than 50%.

In 2022, spending of individuals in the Consumer Sector increased by 34%, out of which migrants have contributed 7 percentage points (1.65 bln GEL). Though expecting a decrease of migrants from 115,000 to 80,500 and their total spending from 1,144 mln USD to 817 mln USD in the January forecast, TBC Capital has revised its outlook for 2023 in April.[18] According to the revised estimates, the number of migrants is expected to remain the same, and expenditures are expected to increase to 1,667 mln USD. Being 5% in 2022, the share of migrant expenditures in the retail sector is expected to reach 5.8% by 2023.

Migrants have rented 31.7% of the total rented apartments in Tbilisi. This residential real estate market showed strong performance in 2022, with migration having a substantial positive direct and indirect contribution to the elevated market indicators. In 2023, residential real estate market indicators (See Figure 10) continued to grow. In February, sale prices posted a 30% annual increase, while rent prices grew by 125%.

Figure 10

TBC Bank Client Survey conducted in December 2022 showed that a large part of migrants receives revenues other than from Russia (Figure 11):[19]

Figure 11

Galt & Taggart

On 1 March 2022, taking into account already imposed sanctions on Russia, G&T had been expecting GDP to remain in positive territory growing by 3.0% in 2022 (revised downwards from our initial forecast of 5.0%) and recovery of tourism at 75% of 2019 level (down from 85% recovery in the initial forecast).[20] Making the prediction, G&T assumed a resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war in 1-2 months.

In case of protracted war and additional sanctions on Russia (e.g., sanctions on Russian oil and gas), G&T had been expecting the Georgian economy to contract by 1.0% in 2022 and recovery of tourism at 60% of 2019 level (down from 85% recovery in the initial forecast).

At the same time, G&T analysts said:[21] “We also see upsides to our growth outlook, considering Georgia a relatively stable destination. As Georgia remains open for Russian visitors with limited other alternatives, we do not rule out growth in tourism arrivals despite the worsened economic situation.”

The report also provided figures on Georgia’s exposure to Russia and Ukraine (See Figure 12).

Figure 12

At the end of March,[22] estimating that the influx of migrants from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine could add 0.3-0.5 percentage points to growth and redirection of international cargo flows through Georgia could expand GDP by another 0.7 percentage points, G&T lifted GDP growth upwards to 4.0-4.5% in 2022, from 3.0% baseline projection.

At the beginning of June, considering high growth in the first 4-month of 2022, external solid earnings, and positive preliminary May data, G&T revised its GDP growth forecast significantly upwards to 7.6% for the full year 2022 from the previous forecast of 4.5%.[23] “Continued growth in external inflows, including tourism revenues - reflecting inflow of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians since the war started in end-February, are another growth drivers. We estimate that around 80,000-120,000 persons (mostly high-paid IT specialists) have reallocated to Georgia to live and work since the end-February, providing a significant boost to the local economy, including sectors like real estate, cafes and restaurants, transport, financial services, and others,” – G&T said and assumed tourism revenues to recover at 80-85% of 2019 level in 2022 before full recovery in 2023. Noticing the surge of remittances from Russia in April 4x y/y (43.2% of total), likely related to an influx of migrants since the war started, analysts had expected remittances to continue growing.

[1] Considering strong growth in the first half of 2022 and June data at the end of June, G&T has revised the 2022 baseline growth forecast up to 9.2% from 7.6%. In July[24] and August,[25] G&T maintained the 2022 baseline growth forecast at 9.2% and, in an optimistic scenario, expected 2022 growth at 10.6% if external inflows would remain strong despite a global slowdown in the second half of the year. Full recovery of tourism in 2022 is likely, analysts concluded in June’s Monthly Economic Review. In July, G&T was more confident about the full recovery than pre-pandemic levels.

As the Georgian economy expanded by 8.8% y/y in September 2022 and by 10.2% overall in 9 months of the year, G&T upgraded[26][27] the 2022 growth projection to 10.2% from the previous (June-July-August) baseline projection of 9.2%. In September’s Monthly Economic Review G&T made a forecast for 2023 and maintained it in October’s Monthly Economic Review: analysts had been expecting growth at 4.8%, considering the lasting impact of migration, stronger tourism, and investment recovery.

Summing up 2022, G&T made the following assessments:[28]Expected adverse impact from Russia’s war in Ukraine did not materialize; contrary to expectations, in 2022, the economy experienced a fast recovery in tourism, a surge in war-related immigration and financial inflows, a rise in transit trade and local investments; war-related inflows of capital as well as relocation of workers and companies boosted demand and strengthened GEL since March 2022.

G&T estimated the direct impact of war-related positive shock (migration, high commodity prices, strong growth in CIS countries, etc.), adding 2-3 percentage points to 2022 growth, stemming from (See it vividly in Figure 13):

• Remittances – the effect was USD 1.8bn (o.w. USD 1.6bn from Russia)

• Tourism – the effect was c. USD 600mn (o.w. c. 50% from Russia)

• Exports – the effect was c. USD 700mn

• Migration boosted the real estate market and investments (FDI more than doubled in the first 9 months of 2022)

• Cargo transit also increased

• Imports increased by an additional USD 1.8bn

Figure 13

Despite the reduction of inflation from its 13.9% peak in January 2022 to 9.8% in December 2022, supported by decelerating commodity prices and GEL appreciation, price pressures remained high throughout 2022. According to G&T,[29] price pressures have been driven by strong demand and rising housing rents (affected partly by migrants), on top of persistent increases in food prices. As in the case of TBC Capital, G&T has also been monitoring the real estate market closely and concluded: “migrants boosted the housing market, and rents skyrocketed.”

In “Georgian Economy: Key macro themes in focus,” G&T also made some predictions about 2023, namely, forecasted GDP growth at 4.8% in 2023: continued recovery in tourism (+15.0% y/y growth), continued growth in investments, and lasting impact of immigration expected to drive 2023 growth along with decelerating inflation pushing up consumer demand.

G&T indicated several risk factors which could affect 2023 growth: lower migrant-related inflows (remittances, tourism); financial outflows (non-resident deposits); house market downturn; low growth in key trading partners; continued immigration from Russia. “If all downside risks realize, then cumulatively, growth may slow to 1.2% from the 4.8% baseline projection in 2023. In the upside scenario, growth may reach 6.9%,” – the analysts concluded in the report.

5 consecutive Monthly Economic Reviews[30] show how initial expectations have been realized (See Figure 14).

Figure 14

Based on these tendencies, by May, G&T forecasted Georgia’s economy to grow by 5.8% in 2023.

Policy and Management Consulting Group (PMCG)

The PMC Research Center has attributed[31] the growth of the Georgian economy by more than 10% in real terms to “a combination of one-off factors, such as:

• The inflow of a considerable number of migrants from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine

• Extremely high inflow of remittances from Russia

• The low base effect due to the recovery of tourism in 2021 is only partial, and the low base effect in January and February due to the severe lockdown restrictions imposed in the corresponding months of 2021

• The increase in demand for and prices of certain commodities affecting exports positively.”

In 2022, external trade turnover in Georgia amounted to US$19 bln, 32.8% higher than in 2021. Georgian exports amounted to US$5.6 bln in 2022, 33.2% more than in 2021. Meanwhile, Georgian imports reached US$13.5 bln in 2022, which is 31.8% higher than in 2021. The PMC Research Center showed (See Figure 15) that “While the trade volume with the EU has been increasing from 2020 to 2022, its share in Georgia’s total trade turnover has decreased. Meanwhile, Russia’s share has been increasing steadily.”

Figure 15

According to the PMC Research Center calculations based on data from the National Bank of Georgia, throughout 2022, the average shares of income from visitors from Russia amounted to 23.7%, from Turkey - 11.2%, and from the EU - 10.8%. Based on data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the center estimated that from January to September of 2022, the difference between entries and exits for Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians was equal to 11, 6, and 59 thousand, respectively. However, Macro Overview reports[32] that “PMC RC has been unable to update the statistics for Ukraine and Belarus after September 2022 since the officially requested public information on entries and exits has not been provided for 2022. Moreover, since the beginning of 2023, the statistics of international travel will not be published monthly due to the new rule of the ministry of internal affairs on transitioning to quarterly publication of border crossing statistics.”

In Figure 16, the PMC Research Center presented markedly how the share of remittances from Russia has risen substantially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The overall remittances in 2022, compared to previous years, increased by 152% compared to 2019, by 132% compared to 2020, and by 86% compared to 2021, but remittances from Russia increased by 403% compared to 2021.

Figure 16

A declining trend in remittances from Russia was noted from 2019 to 2021. However, this was reversed in 2022, as remittances from Russia contributed almost half of all remittances. Even though the total volume of remittances increased from other countries as well, their share declined due to remittances from Russia dramatically rising.

Quarterly the PMC Research Center publishes “Georgian Economic Climate,” in which the center discusses Georgia’s economic climate according to assessments made by various Georgian economists. A total of 60 experts are participating in the survey. In February 2023,[33] almost 83% of the surveyed economists thought that Russia’s war in Ukraine currently represents a high or very high threat to the Georgian economy. On the mass migration of Russian citizens to Georgia, 50% believes it to be a high or very high threat to the Georgian economy, and 50% - to be a low to moderate one.

ISET Policy Institute

Policy Institute (PI) of the International School of Economics at Tbilisi State University (ISET) started analyzing the impact of Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine and the Western sanctions against Russia on the Georgian economy in April 2022.[34] Figure 17 PI shows Georgia’s historic dependence on Russia for foreign goods trade. Though this dependence has declined, it has increased again in recent years.

Figure 17

“The influx of migrants (especially from Russia, who are more likely to have an independent foreign source of income) may have an ambiguous effect on the Georgian economy. On the one hand, the influx may be squeezing the real estate market, but, at the same time, it may boost money inflows from abroad and increase domestic spending and consumption,” – PI predicted in April 2022.

In January 2023, Policy Paper PI registered the primary areas most economists had been expecting a negative impact on the Georgian economy and provided data on what has actually happened during 2022:[35]

Trade

• Expectation: drops as the cost of trade increases, including transportation and logistics disruptions and a slowdown in external demand.

• Fact: Total export growth amounted to 32% in 2022. Much of this growth was driven by trade with CIS countries (44% - excluding Ukraine).

Tourism

• Expectation: drops due to increases in the cost of international and domestic travel, expected decreases in economic activity, and higher food prices affecting hotels and restaurants.

• Fact: As a result of migration, as well as strong tourist inflows from the rest of the world, the recovery of tourism revenues was stronger than expected (by 183% relative to 2021 and by 8% relative to the strong pre-pandemic performance in 2019).
  

Remittances

• Expectations: drops due to potentially fewer monetary inflows from Russia (the ruble was also expected to lose value) and the economic slowdown throughout the rest of Europe.

• Fact: Russia's remittances have increased unprecedentedly since the beginning of the war. In 2022, over two billion USD was derived from Russia – four times the previous year's amount. Russian transfers accounted for 47% of total monetary inflows into Georgia. The initial wave of money transfers, associated with the first wave of migrants from Russia, peaked in May 2022 but later subsided. The second wave of transfers coincided with Russia’s “partial mobilization” announcement on 21 September, alongside the second wave of migrants. Unlike the first wave of inflows, this second wave thus far shows no signs of abating.
  

Depreciation of the domestic currency

• Expectation: anticipated because of a slower rate of remittances and other factors which played out during the latest regional currency crisis in 2014. This would result in higher domestic prices on imported goods, adding to inflationary pressures.

• Fact: Large money inflows caused significant nominal and real appreciation of the Georgian lari. Throughout the course of 2022, the lari appreciated by nearly 25% in nominal terms and by 15% in real terms. The lari also appreciated against the USD during the year, by 12.5% in nominal terms and 19% in real terms.

In January 2023 Policy Paper PI indicates to risks for the Georgian economy in 2023 as follows: Inflation, food security, and poverty; Growing dependency on the Russian market; Migration patterns. According to the paper,[36] though the rate of inflation has been decreasing since its peak in January 2022, due to the contribution of food and fuel to consumer price increases impact the country’s poverty rates might be significant. The impacts of Russian migrants might prove both positive and negative: they come with substantial financial resources, and many of them work remotely or have independent sources of income. This contributes positively to Georgia’s current account balance. On the other hand, their higher income and wealth drive up real estate rental and sale prices, thus pricing out local residents (students, young couples) from the residential real estate market.

Georgian Public Opinion

A year after Russia invaded Ukraine, despite high inflation, the Georgian citizens described the economic situation of their household more positively (See Figure 18).

Figure 18[37]

A positive trend is also observed when citizens are asked about the country's economic situation (See Figure 19).

Figure 19[38]

These results reflect the positive impact of economic growth on households. At the same time, attitude towards Russia remains very negative: in March 2023, 87% of citizens consider Russia as the most significant political threat to Georgia (% in September 2022 and % on March 22), and 76% of citizens consider Russia as the greatest economic threat of Georgia (% in September 2022 and % in March 22).

Notably, a change has been taking place in the Georgian attitude towards Russia for years but intensified after it invaded Ukraine: Georgians are less and less convinced in the reasonableness of dialogue with Russia (See Figure 20); Georgians think that the country’s foreign policy should be only Pro-western despite Russia’s reaction (See Figure 21). Previously, especially in the first years of the Georgian Dream rule, the majority of Georgians preferred having a pro-Western foreign policy but kept up relations with Russia.

Figure 20

Figure 21

Conclusion

A review of the reports of 4 different research institutes shows that the initial assessment of the alleged economic effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on Georgia was negative. Economists have been expecting the development of events in the same way that followed Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 invasion of Ukraine.

Public opinion polls also found that the Georgian public's attitude towards Russia has become even more negative, but the economic benefits of Russian migration have made the country's mood slightly more optimistic.

[1] For example, the arrest of Nika Gvaramia, the founder and general director of the independent TV company "Mtavari" on explicitly politically motivated charges.

[2] See, for example, Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili's speech at GOBSEC, where he repeated the Russian narrative of the causes of the ongoing war.

[3] Macro-Sectoral Overview, TBC Capital, 21 December 2021

[4] Macro-Sectoral Overview, TBC Capital, 21 December 2021

[5] Maintaining Strong Growth, Macro Insights, TBC Capital, 11 April 2022

[6] Georgia: Macro Overview, PMC Research, August 2022

[7] Georgia: Macro Overview, PMC Research, 3 February 2022

[8] “Ukraine-Russia: Rapid or Delayed Resolution?”, TBC Capital, 28 February 2022

[9] “Ukraine-Russia: Rapid or Delayed Resolution?”, TBC Capital, 28 February 2022

[10] “Ukraine-Russia: Rapid or Delayed Resolution?”, TBC Capital, 28 February 2022

[11] Maintaining Strong Growth, Macro Insights, TBC Capital, 11 April 2022

[12] Stronger than 5.5% Baseline, Macro Insights, TBC Capital, 10 May 2022

[13] Up to 8% Baseline, June Macro Update, TBC Capital, 13 June 2022

[14] Thematic Insights from the Chief Economist, TBC Capital, 8 August 2022

[15] Georgia in the turbulent world, Macro & Sectoral Overview, TBC Capital, November 2022

[16] Summary of 2022 and Outlook for 2023, TBC Capital, December 2022

[17] Macro-Sectoral Overview, TBC Capital, January 2023

[18] Macro-Sectoral Overview, TBC Capital, April 2023

[19] Macro-Sectoral Overview, TBC Capital, April 2023

[20] Georgian Economy, Russia-Ukraine War Impact, Galt & Taggart, 1 March 2022

[21] Georgian Economy, Russia-Ukraine War Impact, Galt & Taggart, 1 March 2022

[22] Georgian Economy, Strong growth in Jan-Feb, upsides to growth from influx of migrants and trade flows, Galt & Taggart, 31 March 2022 [23] Georgian Economy, Solid Growth despite Challenges, Galt & Taggart, 9 June 2022

[24] Monthly Economic Review │ Georgia, Galt & Taggart, July 2022

[25] Monthly Economic Review │ Georgia, Galt & Taggart, August 2022

[26] Monthly Economic Review │ Georgia, Galt & Taggart, September 2022

[27] Monthly Economic Review │ Georgia, Galt & Taggart, October 2022

[28] Georgian Economy, Key macro themes in focus, Galt & Taggart, January 27, 2023

[29] Georgian Economy, Key macro themes in focus, Galt & Taggart, January 27, 2023

[30] Monthly Economic Review │ Georgia, Galt & Taggart, January 2023 Monthly Economic Review │ Georgia, Galt & Taggart, February 2023 Monthly Economic Review │ Georgia, Galt & Taggart, March 2023 Monthly Economic Review │ Georgia, Galt & Taggart, April 2023 Monthly Economic Review │ Georgia, Galt & Taggart, May 2023

[31] Georgia: Macro Overview, PMC Research, February 2023

[32] Georgia: Macro Overview, PMC Research, February 2023

[33] Georgian Economic Climate (Q1, 2023), PMC Research, 9 March 2023

[34] Invasion of Ukraine, global sanctions against Russia, and economic consequences for Georgia, ISET Policy Institute, April 2022

[35] The Georgian economy after one year of Russia’s war in Ukraine: trends and risks, ISET Policy Institute, January 2023

[36] The Georgian economy after one year of Russia’s war in Ukraine: trends and risks, ISET Policy Institute, January 2023

[37] GEORGIAN SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION, The Center for Insights in Survey Research, IRI, March 2023

[38] Ibid.